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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1961
Presented below is the ninth annual Survey of Washington Case
Law. The articles in this survey issue have been written by secondyear students as a part of their program to attain status as nominees
to the Law Review. The second-year students were guided in their
work by the Casenote Survey Editor of the Law Review and by various
members of the law school faculty.
The case survey issue does not represent an attempt to discuss every
Washington case decided in 1961. Rather, its purpose is to point out
those cases which, in the opinion of the Editorial Board, constitute
substantial additions to the body of law in Washington.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Driver's License Suspension- Opportunity to be Heard. In
Gnecchi v. State' the Washington Supreme Court failed to take advantage of an opportunity to discredit the right-privilege dichotomy, a
concept which the court has used in the past to determine a citizen's
interest in his driver's license. The court continued to consider the
driver's license a privilege which may be revoked or suspended without
a hearing.
In the Gnecchi case the defendant, Director of Licenses (hereinafter
referred to as the Director), without a hearing entered an order suspending the plaintiff's driver's license for a period of sixty days, pursuant to
RCW 46.20.290.' The plaintiff filed notice of appeal under RCW
46.20.340. He also moved for and obtained, ex parte, a temporary
order restraining the Director from enforcing the order suspending his
license.
2 158 Wash. Dec. 475, 364 P.2d 225 (1961).
2RCW 46.20.290 provides in part, "The director may in his sound discretion immediately suspend the vehicle operator's license of any person whenever he has reason to
believe:... (4) That such person is a habitually reckless or negligent operator of a
motor vehicle or has committed a serious violation of the motor vehicle laws of this
state...."
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The Director filed a motion to quash the temporary restraining
order. At the hearing on the motion the trial court permanently enjoined the Director from suspending the plaintiff's driver's license,
holding that the Washington Administrative Procedure Act3 applied to
the Director" and that he had not complied with its provisions. On
appeal the Director urged that the Washington Administrative Procedure Act does not afford the holder of a driver's license an administrative hearing priorto suspension of the license.
The supreme court accepted the Director's contention in a 5-to-4
decision. The court held that no statute provides for a hearing at the
administrative level prior to suspension of the license,' and that the
plaintiff had no constitutional right to such a hearing since due process
requirements were satisfied by a de novo review in superior court. This
decision was based on an interpretation of the Washington Administrative Procedure Act.
RCW 34.04.090 (1) provides in part, that "In any contested case
all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing after reasonable
notice." (Emphasis added.) "Contested case" is defined in RCW
34.04.010 (3) as "... a proceeding before an agency in which the legal
rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or
constitutionalright to be determined after an agency hearing." (Emphasis added.)
The Washington legislature has expressly provided for de novo review of the Director's order of suspension in the superior court.' There
are no other statutory provisions relating to hearings in connection with
the Director's action.7 An agency hearing prior to the suspension is not
required by (statutory) law.
After determining that no hearing prior to suspension is required by
law, the court considered whether the plaintiff had a constitutional
3RCW 34.04.
4"It is not disputed that the act applies to the department of licenses of this
state.... " Gnecchi v. State, 158 Wash. Dec. 475, 477, 364 P.2d 225, 227 (1961).
5 "In answer to the first question, we find no statute requiring a hearing prior to the
suspension of a motor vehicle operator's license by the director under RCW 46.20.290."
Gnecchi v. State, 158 Wash. Dec. 475, 478, 364 P. 2d 225, 227 (1961).
6 RCW 46.20.340.

7Counsel for the license holder also contended that the director had adopted a point
system for the purpose of determining when a person's license should be suspended.
That a point system was used to some extent was admitted by the counsel for the
director. The majority refused to speculate as to its mode or extent of operation or
how the system was constituted, since there was nothing in the record concerning the
system. There is a possibility that had the question of rule making been raised below
and sufficient facts included in the record to support the rule making contention that
the court may have found that the director had not complied with the rule-making publication requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. Judge Rosellini in his
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right to an agency hearing prior to the suspension of his license. Both
the Washington constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution8 require due process before property can be
taken. The court held that the requirements of due process are satisfied where the decision of the Director is subject to de novo review in
the superior court. In support of its decision the court cited a United
States Supreme Court decision which allowed summary confiscation in
an emergency situation, subject to later full review.9 The Washington
court failed to discuss whether suspension of a driver's license is necessitated by such an emergency as will justify a state agency in acting
summarily. Instead, it went on to say, "Preventing... a habitually
reckless or negligent operator of a motor vehicle... [RCW 46.20.290
(4) ] from driving on public highways is a reasonable exercise of the
police power."'"
To support this statement the court cited Rawson v. Department of
Licenses," which held, in effect, that a license is neither a contract nor
a right but a mere privilege subject to summary revocation by the
officer with power to grant the license. 2 This view, that a license to
drive is a mere privilege, has been adopted by a majority of the courts
which have met the issue. 3 The New Mexico Supreme Court, interpreting a nearly identical statute, followed this approach. 4 The prividissent
licenses
driver's
prevent

took judicial notice of the point schedule and stated that the department of
had promulgated rules and regulations to determine the standard by which a
license would be suspended and formal adoption of standards was needed to
arbitrary and capricious action.
U.S. CoiNsT. amend. XIV; WASH. CoNsT. art. 1, § 3.
0 North American Cold Storage v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908). The
Supreme Court sustained seizure and destruction of spoiled poultry by inspectors without a prior hearing. The Court sustained this action on two grounds: (1) This was
such an emergency that if speedy action was not taken the public might possibly suffer
from food poisoning, and, (2) The seizure and destruction, being only of a product
produced for sale, could be easily compensated for in damages should the seizure and
destruction later be found to be wrongful.
'"Gnecchi v. State, 158 Wash. Dec. 475, 478, 364 P2d 225, 227 (1961).
11 15 \Vn.2d 364, 130 P.2d 876 (1942).
12 Id. at 372, 130 P.2d at 879.
13 Dentamaro v. M.,otor Vehicles Comm'r, 20 Conn. Supp. 205, 130 A.2d 568 (1956);
Smith v. City of Gainsville, 93 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1957) ; Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153,
-16 N.W.2d 52 (1951); Ballow v. Reeves, 238 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1951); Burgess v.
Mayor & Aldermen of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 126 N.E. 456 (1920) ; Barbieri v. Morris, 315 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1953) ; Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620
(1952); Garford Trucking Inc., v. Hoffman, 114 N.J.L. 522, 177 Atl. 882 (1935);
Johnson v. Sanchez, 67 N.-M. 41, 351 P.2d 449 (1960) ; Commonwealth v. Harrison, 183
Pa. Super. 133, 130 A.2d 198 (1957) ; La Plante v. State, 47 R.I. 258, 131 At. 641
(1926); Sullins v. Butler, 175 Tenn. 468, 135 S.W.2d 930 (1940) ; Law v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 449, 199 S.E. 516 (1938) ; Nulter v. State, 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549
(1937) ; State v. Stehlek, 262 Wis. 642, 56 N.W.2d 514 (1953). A directly contrary
view has been reached in Colorado. People v. Nathas, 363 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1961).
14 Johnson v. Sanchez, 67 N.M. 41, 351 P.2d 449 (1960).
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lege doctrine has been followed by the Washington court in other
licensing areas."
Courts in some jurisdictions, after labeling the driver's license as a
privilege, allow summary revocation without any statutory provision
for review of the administrative action.16 Their rationale is that since
the activity can be constitutionally prohibited, it can also be restricted
in almost any way the state deems necessary." These courts do not
explain why an individual whose driving can constitutionally be prohibited is not entitled to procedural fairness after he is licensed.
The privilege doctrine has been rejected in some jurisdictions. The
state courts in Minnesota, New York and California have flatly rejected it in their more recent decisions.' The Minnesota court in State
v. Moseng stated:
It is therefore clear that, whether a driver's license may be termed a
privilege or a right, such license, whether restricted or not, once
granted, is of substantial value to the holder thereof and it may not be
suspended or revoked arbitrarily or capriciously.19
These courts have adopted a policy worthy of examination by the
Washington court. They look beyond the right-privilege concept and
determine whether a particular type of license suspension gives the
holder fair treatment. The value of the license to its holder and the
harm which may result to him from a wrongful suspension are weighed
against the needs of the motoring public for quick action.2" Procedural
safeguards provided in the administrative process are also taken into
consideration.
The automobile has become an essential means of transportation to
the average American. A license to drive that automobile is equally
15 State ex rel Sayles v. Superior Court, 120 Wash. 183, 206 Pac. 966 (1922) (Pool
hall) ; Asakura v. City of Seattle, 122 Wash. 81, 210 Pac. 30 (1922), rev'd on other
grounds, 265 U.S. 332 (1923) (Pawn broker); Bungalow Amusement Co. v. City of
Seattle, 148 Wash. 485, 269 Pac. 1043 (1928) (Dance ball).
16 Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52 (1951) ; Nulter v. State, 119 W.Va.
312, 193 S.E. 549 (1937).
1 Johnson v. Sanchez, 67 N.M. 41, 351 P.2d 449 (1960).
Is Irvine v. State Board of Equalization, 40 Cal. App. 2d 280, 104 P.2d 847 (1940);
State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 95 N.W2d 6 (1959); People v. McAnarney, 210
N.Y.S.2d 340 (Schuyler County Ct. 1961).
19 State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 95 N.W.2d 6, 13 (1959).
20 The legislature has determined that the safety of the public requires immediate
action before a hearing. The argument in support of this determination is weakened by
the fact that after a period of sixty days, with nothing except the deprivation of the
right to drive, the license holder will be able to drive again. The statute appears to be
punishing the driver in hopes of better driving habits in the future. Punishment is
usually preceded by a hearing.
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essential. In some cases a license to drive may be more important than
an automobile since many occupations require a driver's license.

At the same time, the reasons for not allowing certain unsafe drivers
on our public highways are obvious. The need for immediate action in
removing habitually reckless or negligent drivers from the highway is
obvious too. The Washington legislature2 has determined that there

is a compelling public need for summary revocation to protect the
public on our highways. 2 The Washington statute provides for a summary suspension with full de novo review within ten days after the
23

suspension.
In some instances judicial review will not provide the most practical
means for finding facts. In technical areas and where the cost of
appealing is great the requirements of fair procedure may require a
hearing at the administrative level..24 The revocation or suspension of
a driver's license does not fall into either of these categories. In suspending a driver's license, the question which according to the statute
the administrator must answer, is whether the driver is habitually reckless or negligent. 5 In the de novo review before the superior court the
same issue receives a complete review. The court's judgment is based
upon the violation then before it and the driver's past convictions for
improper operation of a motor vehicle. In most cases the judge will be
as well qualified as the administrator in his determination. As a result
every driver will receive as fair treatment as the law can provide,
within ten days. As a California court has stated, "Although the
requirements of due process often involve a full hearing, it has long
been recognized that where public necessity requires, there can be
action followed by a hearing." 6
A less extreme approach might have been taken. The Washington
legislature could have provided that during the ten-day period following
notice of appeal to the superior court the driver's suspension would be
21 RCW 46.20.290.

22 The Massachusets legislature decided that the value of a drivers license out-weighs
the public need for immediate summary action. The Massachusets Administrative Procedure Act provides in part, "Except as otherwise provided in this section, (referring
to suspension without administrative discretion) no agency shall revoke or refuse to
renew any license unless it has first afforded the licensee an opportunity for a hearing."
Mass. G.L. (Ter. Ed.) ch. 30 A, § 13.
23 RCW 46.20.340.
24 Davis, The Requirement of Opportunity To Be Heard In Th.e Administrative
Process,51 YALE L.J. 1093 (1942).
25 RCW 46.20.290.
2
Hesperia Land Development Co. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. Rptr. 815, 820 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
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temporarily stayed. The net effect of such a legislative provision would
be that, in most instances the individuals who had received fair treatment at the administrative level would not appeal, and those drivers
with a special hardship or with an improper suspension could, with a
small amount of danger to the public, continue to drive until they had
had an opportunity to be heard. Texas has adopted this approach in
the licensing area."
In Gnecchi the Washington court has continued to follow the privilege doctrine in the licensing area. It is suggested that the privilege
doctrine should have been rejected and at the same time the Director's
action could have been sustained. The court should have adopted the
position that once the state has issued the license a valuable interest
attaches and that the license holder cannot be deprived of his interest
without receiving fair treatment. Immediate suspension of a driver's
license, subject to speedy and complete judicial review such as is provided in Washington, affords fair treatment when viewed in terms of
the pressing public necessity which is involved. This, rather than the
conclusion that a driver's license is a privilege for which any procedure
will satisfy due process, should be the basis for upholding the immediate
suspension of a driver's license without a prior hearing.
FRED D. SMITH

Standing to Challenge Constitationality of Loyalty Oath. In
Nostrand v. Little,' the Washington State Supreme Court had an opportunity to pass on the much publicized loyalty oath required of
certain state employees. Against a charge that procedural due process
was violated because the statute calls for immediate dismissal upon
non-compliance, the court found that the oath abridged no constitutional rights of the plaintiffs, two University of Washington professors.
The background of the case is both interesting and complex. In
1959, the professors asked for a declaratory judgment 2 to determine the
constitutionality of the statute requiring them to take an oath and
sign an affidavit in which they disclaimed any present association with
the Communist Party or any other subversive organizations. They
27 Dep't of Public Safety v. Gillaspie, 254 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) aff'd
on rehearing,259 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Sup. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 933 (1954).

158 Wn.2d 111,361 P.2d 551 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 436 (1962).
2 Nostrand v. Balmer, 53 Wrn.2d 460, 335 P.2d 10 (1959),
remanded, 362 U.S. 474

(1960).

